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Policies to stimulate innovation and economic growth are high on the agenda in all OECD countries. 
A strong link between investments in research and economic growth is often taken for granted, and 
many countries have explicit and ambitious goals regarding the economy’s R&D intensity. Setting 
such goals suggests there is a role for government intervention, and that there are many potential 
market failures in the market for research and development. In theory, these could lead to 
overinvestment as well as underinvestment, but based on empirical research there is a fairly broad 
consensus that a free market underinvests in R&D.2 For this reason OECD countries use large sums on 
R&D subsidies, and innovation policy receives considerable attention in the public debate. However, 
there is no strong consensus regarding the effectiveness of such policies.  
 
R&D subsidies can be given as R&D tax credits or as direct grants.3 Tax incentives have become an 
increasingly popular policy tool over the last decades, and more than 20 countries now use the tax 
system in order to increase R&D in industry. Norway has been the first Nordic country to introduce 
R&D tax credits.4 When the Norwegian Parliament approved the R&D tax credit scheme, it also 
decided that the scheme should be evaluated during its first five years of operation. Our research group 
in Statistics Norway was responsible for most of the evaluation, including the final report and the 
assessments made therein. In this paper we briefly discuss the main findings of the evaluation. 5 
1.1. The introduction of an R&D tax credit Scheme in Norway 
The introduction of an R&D tax credit in Norway was proposed by the Hervik Commission in a green 
paper for the Ministry of Trade and Industry in 2000 (NOU 2000:7). The commission was appointed 
to suggest policy measures aimed at encouraging industry to invest more in R&D. The Norwegian 
Parliament had earlier in 2000 agreed to make increased R&D investments a national priority, and 
decided that R&D relative to GDP should at least reach the OECD average by 2005. This illustrates a 
general point. Generous R&D tax credit schemes are often introduced in countries where R&D 
                                                     
1 This paper is an English summary of the main evaluation report “Evaluering av SkatteFUNN”, Reports 2008/2, Statistics 
Norway, Oslo. The Research department of Statistics Norway was responsible for the evaluation, and the project was 
financed by the Research Council of Norway. 
2 See e.g. Griliches (2000) for a broad survey and Wieser (2005) for a recent meta-analysis.  
3 See Hall and van Reenen (2000), David, Hall and Toole (2000), Garcia-Quevedo (2004), Mohnen and Lokshin (2009) and 
Ientile and Mairesse (2009) for useful surveys of the literature on R&D subsidies. See also Bloom, Griffith and van Reenen 
(2002) for an authoritative empirical analysis of R&D tax credits. 
4 See Møen (2007) for a discussion of the pros et cons of introducing an R&D tax credit scheme in a small open economy. 
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investments are low by international standards, and where the sentiment is that “something needs to be 
done”.  
 
The Hervik commission suggested using an R&D tax credit as one of several policy tools to stimulate 
R&D investments. They argued that the proposed R&D tax credit would be administratively simpler 
and more robust to informational problems than direct R&D grants. It was intended to be the main 
policy tool towards small and medium sized firms (SMEs). In the commission’s opinion, the Research 
Council of Norway should focus on R&D of strategic importance, and spend their resources initiating 
and evaluating large projects. It also argued that an R&D tax credit scheme would provide more stable 
conditions for the business community than direct grants. The total subsidy would not be subject to 
annual budget debates, and the detailed regulations would be embedded in the general tax code. Of 
course, the specifics of the scheme, such as deduction rates and rules on eligibility etc. could change 
over time, but it was a widely held view that it would be less vulnerable to discretionary budget policy 
than direct R&D grants. 
 
In connection with the Norwegian Parliament’s processing of the revised national budget of 2001, the 
government was asked by a parliament majority to submit a proposal for a tax relief scheme for firms’ 
R&D expenses. The scheme was presented in connection with the national budget for 2002, passed by 
the Parliament in December 2001 and brought into force for the fiscal year 2002. The scheme is 
codified in § 16-40 of the Norwegian Taxation Act. 
1.2. The details of the scheme6 
The Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme, “Skattefunn”, implies that a certain percentage of a firm’s 
R&D expenditures is deductible against taxes. The deduction is subject to specific criteria. A firm 
must meet the relevant terms and have its project plan approved by the Skattefunn secretariat which is 
part of the Research Council of Norway. Another government agency, Innovation Norway, is helping 
firms through the application process and makes a first assessment of whether the projects qualify for 
support or not. The actual R&D expenditures have to be approved by the tax authorities, who mainly 
base their judgement on a statement from the applicant’s auditor. 
Originally, only SMEs were eligible. An SME was defined as a firm fulfilling two of the following 
three criteria: (i) Fewer than 100 employees (ii) an annual turnover of less than NOK 80 million  – 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 In total, 17 reports were produced as part of the evaluation project. The reports are available at the project’s website 
www.ssb.no/skattefunn. Some of these reports are written in English. 
6 The following description borrows from OECD (2007, p. 112), Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka (2007b, Appendix A) and 
http://web.skattefunn.no/index.php?kat=English.  
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about EUR ten million (iii) an annual balance sheet total of less than NOK 40 million – about EUR 
five million.  
 
Already in 2003 large enterprises were included as well. Large enterprises may deduct 18 percent of 
expenses related to an approved R&D project from taxes owed. A 20 percent deduction is possible if 
the following conditions for being a “small enterprise” are fulfilled: (i) Fewer than 250 employees, (ii) 
an annual turnover not exceeding EUR40 million or an annual balance sheet total not exceeding EUR 
27 million and (iii) less than 25 per cent of the company is owned by a large enterprise. This 
distinction between large and small enterprises follows EU/EEA state aid rules.7 The maximum basis 
for deduction was at the outset NOK 4 million per year (about EUR 500 000) for R&D projects 
conducted by the enterprise itself. Stimulating cooperation between academia and commerce is 
considered an important objective of the scheme. For this reason, a firm could purchase R&D services 
from universities and R&D institutes for another NOK 4 million under the scheme. If the firm did not 
conduct in-house R&D, it could purchase R&D services for a total of NOK 8 million. This cap was the 
maximum sum from which a tax deduction could be calculated. In 2009, the caps were increased to 
NOK 5.5 and 11 million, respectively. 
 
In order to qualify for the tax credit, the R&D activity must come under the definition of R&D as 
stipulated in the scheme. This definition is very similar to that given in the Frascati manual. The 
project must be limited and focused, and it must be aimed at generating new knowledge, information 
or experience which is presumed to be of use for the enterprise in developing new or improved 
products, services or manufacturing/processing methods. Standard product development with no 
research component is not covered by the scheme. 
 
There are no constraints or extra incentives in the scheme based on industry or region. Enterprises that 
are not currently liable to taxation are also eligible. If the tax credit exceeds the tax payable by the 
firm, the difference is paid to the firm in the form of a negative tax or a grant. If the firm is not in a tax 
position at all, the whole amount of the tax credit is paid to the firm as a grant. In practice this has 
turned out to be a very important feature of the scheme. Around three-quarters of the total support 
given through the scheme is paid out as grants. The payment is made when the tax authorities have 
completed their tax assessment, and takes place the year after the actual R&D expenses have occurred. 
The R&D tax credit is thus neutral with regard  to qualifying projects, regions, industries and the tax 
position of the qualifying firms, but lowers the marginal cost of low R&D spenders and is slightly 
                                                     
7 EEA is the European Economic Area of which Norway is a part. Norway is not a member of the EU. 
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more generous to small firms than to large firms. For firms that would have spent more on R&D than 
the maximum amount in the scheme even without the presence of the tax credit, the scheme gives little 
or no incentive on the margin to increase R&D investments, although they have a clear incentive to 
qualify for the scheme and receive the tax deduction.8 
1.3. Applications, R&D expenses and tax deductions 
The total maximum tax deduction for a small establishment was at the outset NOK 1.6 million per 
year (20 % of 8 million). For large establishments included in the scheme in 2003, it was NOK 1.44 
million (18 % of 8 million).9 However, the average tax deduction per tax credit project has been much 
lower than this. Table 1 below shows the development in the number of applications, budgeted and 
actual R&D expenses, as well tax deductions in the years 2002-2009. Figures for R&D are based on 
data from the Research Council of Norway and tax data from the Directorate of Taxes.  
 
Table 1: Applications, R&D expenses and tax deductions 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Number of applications by year of submission    
Total number of applications 3287 4739 4225 3176 2624 2104 2071 2121
Applications approved 2798 3532 2762 2177 1801 1530 1549 1596
Applications rejected   397   974 1160   699   543 574 522 525
Percentage approved (incl. withdrawn applications) 85 75 65 69  70 73 75 75
    
Active projects, budgeted and actual R&D costs, NOK mill.    
Number of active projects 2798 5571 6079 5137 4055 3735 3527 3560
Total budgeted R&D costs (approved projects, figures from NFR) 4526 9032 9643 9003 8457 7500 8300 9300
Total actual R&D expenses approved by auditor (figures from SKD) 4098 7543 8189 7412 6889 5900 6300 n.a
    
Total tax reduction 690 1274 1388 1220 1126 952 1004 n.a
Of which paid out as a grant 568 991 1055 908   824 n.a n.a n.a
Total corporate taxes payable for firm receiving tax deductions 164 2743 4960 4055 4648 n.a n.a n.a
    
Actual R&D expenses in per cent of the budget 91 84 85 82  81 79 76 n.a
Paid deduction in per cent of total deductions 82 78 76 74  73 n.a n.a n.a
Deductions in per cent of corporate taxes payable 42 46 28 30  24 n.a n.a n.a
 
                                                     
8 In theory, the presence of liquidity constraints or internal political processes related to the investment budget could also give 
firms whose R&D expenditures exceed the maximum amount of the scheme an incentive to increase their R&D investments.   
9 The maximum deductions increased by 37.5 per cent in 2009. 
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For the years 2002-2006, the table corresponds to Table 1.1 in Cappelen et al (2008). The table is 
updated with three more years using numbers from annual reports published by the Skattefunn 
secretariat at www.skattefunn.no. SKD is the Norwegian Directorate of Taxes. NFR is the Research 
Council of Norway. n.a means not available. 
 
The number of applications received by the R&D tax credit secretariat has varied over time. In the first 
year, 2002, there were 3300 applications. When the scheme was made universal in 2003 the number 
increased to 4700 applications, but thereafter it has gradually fallen. In 2009 there were 2100 
applications. About 25-30 percent of the applications are rejected, withdrawn or returned due to 
incomplete information. Some of the applications are for projects that last for several years, and the 
number of “active projects” under the scheme has varied between 3000 and 6000. Some firms apply 
for several projects simultaneously, and the average number of projects per firm is 1.5-1.6. The total 
R&D expenses under the scheme have been fairly stable because the average project size has increased 
over time.  About two thirds of the R&D expenses are personnel costs, which is quite typical for 
R&D-projects. The actual R&D costs reported to the tax authorities tend to be about 20 percent lower 
than what is proposed in the original applications to the Research Council. About 85 percent of the 
costs applied for are accepted by the tax authorities as a basis for deduction. 
 
In 2006, the total tax deduction was 140 million Euros. Out of this as much as 100 million Euros were 
paid out as a grant from the tax authorities to firms that were not in a tax position or would have paid 
less in taxes than their R&D tax relief. This illustrates the fact that the scheme is particularly popular 
with small and newly established firms. Roughly 85 percent of all approved projects are undertaken by 
firms with less than 50 employees. 50-60 percent of the applications are from firms with less than ten 
employees. These firms perform about 45 percent of the total R&D under the scheme. For all firms 
receiving subsidies through the R&D tax credit scheme, the average tax credit is about 1000 Euros per 
employee. Average corporate tax paid per employee for the same firms in absence of the subsidy 
would have been 2300 Euros. Hence, in these terms, the subsidy is rather substantial.10 
 
The R&D tax credit scheme is used by 10-15 percent of all manufacturing firms, but only one percent 
of the firms in construction and most service sectors. 11 Due to a large number of firms in the service 
sector, however, the number of applications from service firms is somewhat larger than the number of 
applications from manufacturing firms. Low average R&D intensity is a general characteristic of the 
                                                     
10 These numbers are based on an analysis of data for 2005. 
11 These numbers are based on an analysis of data for 2004. 
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service industries worldwide, and in most tax credit schemes in Europe, services are not included. The 
number of applications from firms in the service industries has increased over time, and in 2008, 55 % 
of the applications where filed by firms in a service industry. 
 
Within the service sector, firms using the tax credit are concentrated in two industries, computing 
(NACE 72) and consulting (NACE 74.1-74.4). The ICT-industry in total performs 19 % of the R&D 
that is supported under the tax credit scheme. No other industry has a larger share. In addition a large 
number of projects in other industries are ICT-related. In 2009, 42 percent of all accepted applications 
were classified as ICT.  
1.4. OECD Asessment and Recent changes to the scheme 
OECD (2007, p. 112), describes the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme as rather generous by 
international standards. The OECD’s “B-index” calculations averaged about 22 percent in 2006. This 
is well above the OECD average and is exceeded only by Canada, the Czech Republic, Portugal, 
Mexico and Spain. It should be noted, however, that the calculations do not take into account caps in 
tax deduction schemes. For Norway, therefore, the B-index applies to a firm not constrained by the 
cap in the tax credit scheme. Direct government funding of private R&D in Norway was 0.11 percent 
of GDP in 2004. This is close to the OECD average, and well above the median. As mentioned 
already, the caps were increased in the fiscal year 2009. 
 
As from the fiscal year 2007, a maximum hourly rate and a maximum number of hours per year for in-
house R&D personnel were introduced. The ceiling for payroll and indirect expenses was set at NOK 
500 per hour (around 60 Euro). Up to 1850 hours per year may be approved per person associated with 
the project. This has made the scheme slightly less generous than in previous years, in particular for 
firms in the ICT-industries where salaries are high. 
 
The Norwegian Parliament decided in 2005 to include financial support to unpaid labour in R&D 
activities in the tax credit scheme, in order to reach high tech entrepreneurs that do not draw wages 
from their firms. The amendment needed approval from the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA). ESA 
did not conclude until March 2008. Support to unpaid labour was paid for the years 2002-2005, but the 




The 2007 OECD survey makes some normative comments about the scheme: 
• The broadly neutral construction of the Skattefunn is a point in its favour, especially in Norway 
where there is a long tradition of including regional, social and sectoral goals in industrial policy. 
Of course, lower taxes on firms have to be compensated by higher taxes elsewhere. It is also pos-
sible that firms now claim tax credits against spending that they would not previously have classi-
fied as R&D. ... The effectiveness of the Skattefunn in stimulating additional private R&D is cur-
rently under evaluation. ... [T]here is the possibility that even if the tax credit stimulates genuine 
additional R&D, the tax expenditures could have been better used in other areas. 
2. Main findings from OUR evaluation: Does the tax credit work 
as intended? 
Statistics Norway was asked to evaluate the R&D tax credit scheme along several dimensions:  
• The scheme’s ability to stimulate extra R&D effort and change firms’ R&D behaviour 
• The scheme’s effect on innovation and value creation in firms 
• The scheme’s user-friendliness 
• The scheme’s administrative costs for users, tax authorities, the Research Council and other pub-
lic agencies 
• The scheme’s effect on R&D cooperation between firms and research institutes 
• The relation between the R&D tax credit scheme and other R&D incentives 
• How the Norwegian scheme compares to R&D tax credit schemes in other countries, and the 
experience other countries have with such schemes 
• The quality of the projects supported under the scheme and the extent to which they are tax moti-
vated (including reclassification of other costs) 
 
Below, we summarize our main findings. The evaluation utilized data from 1993 to 2006. The 
evaluation project started in 2004 and concluded in January 2008. 
2.1. Input additionality: Does The tax credit scheme lead to more R&D in firms? 
Hægeland and Møen (2007a) evaluate the degree of input additionality, i.e. to what extent the scheme 
induces firms to invest more in R&D than they otherwise would have done. This is obviously a critical 
aspect when evaluating the overall efficiency of the scheme. Identifying this effect in a non-
experimental setting, where access to the scheme is in principle universal, is difficult. Hægeland and 
Møen use a difference-in-difference regression approach in their main analysis.  
10 
Their descriptive analyses clearly show that firms that have received support through the tax credit 
scheme have more growth in their R&D investments than other firms. The difference-in-difference 
regressions show that firms that previously invested less than the 4 million in-house R&D cap have 
increased their R&D investments more than those previously above the cap. The latter group is used as 
a control group because firms that invest more than the 4 million cap are not subsidized at the margin 
and hence have little or no incentive to increase their R&D expenditure as a result of the R&D tax 
credit scheme.12  
 
The estimated input additionality is mainly driven by firms that did not invest very much in R&D 
before the tax credit scheme was introduced. Hægeland and Møen also find that firms that previously 
did not invest in R&D were more likely to start doing so after the introduction of the tax credit 
scheme. The additionality appears to be strongest in small firms, firms in non-central areas, firms in 
which the employees have a relatively low level of education and firms in industries that are 
traditionally not research intensive. Obviously, these firms are typically small R&D performers. 
 
The empirical results in Hægeland and Møen (2007a) are consistent with the tax credit scheme being 
effective in stimulating R&D investments. The main results are qualitatively the same across various 
data sources and model specifications. The estimates of how much extra R&D the tax credits trigger 
per NOK in lost tax revenue vary between 1.3 and 2.9, with 2 representing the best point estimate. 
This is high in comparison to other estimates in the international literature, see e.g. Ientile and 
Mairesse (2009), and it implies that for every Norwegian krone received by the firms in tax deduction, 
two kroner are spent on R&D. However, it is worth noting that the strategy used to identify the effect 
of the tax credit scheme is not bullet proof. The main reason for this is that the tax credit scheme is 
available to all firms. A causal interpretation of the results rests among other things on the assumption 
that small and large R&D firms (below and above the 4 million cap) are equally affected by changes in 
economic trends and macroeconomic framework conditions other than the tax credit scheme. In 
addition, the effects are estimated with considerable uncertainty. 
2.2. Output additionality: Does the tax credit lead to increased added value and 
more innovations? 
Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka (2007a) find that the tax credit scheme contributes to an increase in 
the rate of innovation in firms. Tax credit projects contribute to the development of new production 
processes and to some extent to new products for the firm. It is shown that firms that collaborate with 
                                                     
12 See, however, our remark in footnote 8. 
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other firms are more likely to have successful innovations. However, the scheme does not appear to 
contribute to innovations in the form of new products for the market or firms’ patenting.  Cappelen, 
Raknerud and Rybalka (2007b) find that tax credit projects have a positive effect on productivity and 
productivity growth, to about the same extent as other R&D activity. There is a tendency for the return 
to be slightly higher for pure company-financed R&D work than for R&D carried out under the tax 
credit scheme. This is in line with expectations. On average, Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka find 
that business profitability increases moderately as a result of the tax credit scheme. However, the 
return on R&D financed under the scheme is very unevenly distributed between recipient firms, and 
28 per cent of the firms have zero returns. These return estimates are based on data from the first few 
years after the scheme was introduced. This may imply that the estimates are somewhat on the low 
side. However, the R&D that the tax credit has stimulated is probably so market oriented that the 
results of the innovations will typically emerge shortly after the project has been completed. 
 
External effects of R&D are difficult to estimate with any precision. Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka 
(2007c) find that the increased R&D investments that the tax credit scheme leads to, have the greatest 
positive effect in R&D-intensive industries and counties. This may suggest that there are positive 
external effects. However, the innovations that the scheme mainly stimulates – new products for the 
firm and not for the market – are not of such a nature that large external effects should be expected. 
2.3. Behavioural additionality: Does the tax credit lead to changes in R&D be-
haviour in firms?13 
A main finding in the input additionality analysis is that the tax credit scheme stimulates firms with no 
or limited previous R&D activity to initiate such activity. One might argue that this implies a change 
in firm behavior. However, the fact that a firm changes its adaptation, by responding to the 
introduction of the tax credit scheme, does not mean that it changes its behaviour, i.e. the way it 
responds. In order to explore this issue, Alsos et al. (2007) examine the firm’s internal working 
methods and processes, with particular focus on the significance of entrepreneurial information and 
dynamic capabilities for change. A survey among firms that applied for the tax credit shows that a 
very high percentage of these firms have increased their focus on R&D as a result of the tax credit 
scheme, and that the scheme has resulted in the firms having closer contact with universities, 
university colleges, research institutes, customers and suppliers. Whether firms have the motivation, 
ability and resources to succeed with innovation, is vital to what effect public policy instruments have 
on R&D behaviour. The survey shows that many firms receiving the tax credit change their R&D 
                                                     
13 The sub-project on behavioural additionality, was carried out by Nordland Research Institute. 
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behaviour, and that positive development in R&D behaviour to a large extent can be explained by 
internal conditions of the firms, e.g. the firms’ resource base, dynamic capabilities and entrepreneurial 
information. Alsos et al. find that firms with limited R&D experience at the start-up of a project have 
changed their R&D behaviour the most. Firms with a high level of R&D activity before the start-up of 
an R&D tax credit project do not report a positive change in R&D behaviour. The analysis shows that 
these firms do not manage to increase their level of R&D activity over time. 
2.4. Does the R&D tax credit lead to more collaboration between industry and 
research institutes? 
One of the purposes of the tax credit scheme is to stimulate collaboration between firms and research 
institutes and universities. Cappelen et al. (2008, ch. 5) report that between 2002 and 2006 almost 
every fifth firm purchased R&D services from a research institute approved by the Research Council. 
Hægeland and Møen (2007a, ch. 6.4) find that the probability of initiating such an external 
collaboration has only increased slightly after the introduction of the tax credit scheme, and that the 
probability of continuing such collaboration for those who already collaborate, remains unchanged. 
Hægeland and Møen also find that the input additionality effect of such collaboration projects is 
slightly lower than for R&D activities carried out solely in-house. 
 
Cappelen, Raknerud and Rybalka (2007a) find indications that the tax credit scheme stimulates 
collaboration between firms to a limited extent only.  One reason is obviously that the tax credit 
scheme is not designed with this purpose in mind. Another reason may be that projects under the 
scheme lead to innovations of the type “new production processes” or “developing a new product for 
the firm, not for the market”. It is not surprising that there are not many collaboration projects between 
firms carrying out innovations of this nature. However, firms that do collaborate with other firms are 
more likely to succeed with their innovations. 
2.5. To what extent does the tax credit scheme affect the utilisation of other in-
novation policy instruments? 
Hægeland and Møen (2007b) analyse the relationship between the R&D tax credit scheme and other 
innovation policy instruments. They find no evidence suggesting that the R&D tax credit increases the 
probability of receiving direct R&D grants from the Research Council of Norway in the future, but 
they cannot exclude the possibility of an immediate positive effect. Firms with R&D tax credit 
projects have an increased likelihood of receiving direct R&D grants from the Research Council in the 
same year. At the individual firm level, therefore, direct subsidies and the tax credit seem to be 
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complements. At the more aggregate level, however, the two instruments seem to be substitutes as the 
probability of receiving direct R&D grants fell after the introduction of the tax credit scheme. 
 
In the years after the introduction of the tax credit scheme, firms that applied for support from the 
Research Council or received support from Innovation Norway in one year, were much more likely to 
reapply the year after as compared to the years prior to the scheme. It therefore seems that the R&D 
tax credit scheme has stimulated greater persistence in the use of other policy instruments. It is easy to 
demonstrate that firms receiving the R&D tax credit are in contact with the innovation policy system 
to a greater extent than other firms, but this cannot be interpreted as a causal effect. Both the Research 
Council of Norway and Innovation Norway require firms to apply for the R&D tax credit before other 
additional support is provided. However, firms that have not previously been in contact with the 
innovation policy system are more likely to have such contact after the R&D tax credit scheme was 
introduced. This suggests that the tax credit scheme has made the innovation policy system available 
to a new group of firms.  
 
Hægeland and Møen (2007b, ch. 5) also analyse how the input additionality varies between different 
R&D policy instruments. They find that the additionality is high for both R&D tax credits and for 
direct R&D grants from the Research Council of Norway, while project support from ministries and 
the EU has lower additionality.  
2.6. To what extent does the R&D tax credit affect the strategy of research insti-
tutes? 
Cappelen et al (2008, ch. 5) report that 19 per cent of the firms receiving an R&D tax credit in 2006 
had deductions for the purchase of R&D services from approved R&D institutes. Even more firms 
stated in questionnaires that they had formed collaborations with such institutes, and it is of course 
possible to collaborate without purchasing of services partly financed by the R&D tax credit scheme. 
The firms believed that these collaborative relations are important for the execution and success of 
projects. A survey of 18 approved research institutes showed that many institutes had no knowledge as 
to which of the projects they were involved in that were partly financed by R&D tax credits. This is 
not surprising since the firms receiving the R&D tax credit do not have any incentives to report this to 
the institutes.  
 
The R&D tax credit scheme does not seem to have a great bearing on the research institutes in terms 
of research volume, nor does it seem to have affected the research institutes’ behaviour to any notable 
degree. One institute stated that it had a tendency to increase its prices if it knew that the project was 
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financed through the tax credit scheme. Some institutes had mentioned the possibility of receiving the 
tax credit to firms that made contact regarding project collaboration, but no institute had used the fact 
that collaborative R&D would qualify for a tax credit actively in their marketing efforts.  
2.7. To what extent are the supported R&D projects tax-motivated? 
Money allocated through the R&D tax credit scheme should be spent on R&D, but the tax authorities 
must to a large extent rely on the taxpayer’s own declaration when calculating the tax deduction. 
Fjærli (2007) reports that the majority of auditors believe that it is difficult to control whether the sums 
specified are actually spent on R&D. The most difficult aspect is whether the reported man-hours used 
are realistic. 80 per cent of the auditors perceived this to be difficult, and their perception is 
strengthened by Fjærli’s own analysis. He reviews around 300 project accounts collected from one 
county for the years 2003 and 2004. The time sheets were often of poor quality and only about half 
were of sufficient quality to be used in the analysis. A comparison of the usable parts of these time 
sheets with what firms report in the R&D surveys conducted by Statistics Norway, shows that time 
recorded per employee in the timesheets is 50 to 100 per cent higher than expected based on the firms’ 
characteristics. This could be an indication that the time spent on R&D in tax credit projects is 
overestimated in the project accounts.  Some firms have extremely high tax deductions, high budgeted 
R&D costs measured per employee, and unreasonably high personnel costs measured in relation to the 
firm’s actual salary costs.  It is, however, difficult to obtain an accurate picture of the extent of the 
inflation of R&D costs. The suspicious numbers seem to be driven by the five to ten per cent of the 
firms with the highest values. These firms are generally small, typically having less than 10 
employees.  
 
Small firms with just one employee are often sole proprietor limited companies with an active owner. 
These firms are well suited to investigate tax-motivated disposals since other explanations such as the 
demand for expensive well-educated personnel are eliminated. Among these firms, Fjærli often finds 
that both the tax deduction and the budgeted R&D costs are high compared to the firm’s actual salary 
payments. This may indicate that tax adjustments are made through the reporting of inflated man-
hours in the R&D tax credit projects, or that the hourly rate of pay used does not correspond with 
actual salary. The salary paid is sometimes very high in these firms, however, often despite low 
operating profit. In similar firms with no R&D tax credit financed activities, the operating profit 
adjusted for own salary is higher, while the actual salary is lower. This suggests that tax adjustments 
sometimes are made through an increase in the calculation basis for the hourly rate of pay. 
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2.8. How accessible and user-friendly is the tax credit scheme? 
As a part of the evaluation, Statistics Norway conducted two surveys asking firms’ about their 
experiences with the R&D tax credit scheme, one in 2005 and one in 2007. These are analyzed in 
Foyn and Kjesbu (2006) and Foyn and Lien (2007), respectively. A general finding is that firms with 
approved projects are far more positive to the scheme than firms that have had projects rejected. 
Furthermore, the firms are generally more positive to the tax credit scheme in the 2007 survey than in 
the 2005 survey. The 2005 survey showed that the tax credit scheme was well known already at that 
time.  On the whole, the firms are satisfied with the information about the scheme that is available at 
the Skattefunn website, www.skattefunn.no. The responses in 2007 are similar to those of the first 
survey, but reveal that a relatively high percentage of firms are not sufficiently familiar with the 
regulations of the scheme. This applies in particular to the provision that the calculated tax deduction 
is paid out as a grant in cases where firms are not liable to taxation, or where the assessed tax is less 
than the deduction. 
 
Although many firms state that the information on the Skattefunn website is good, almost half of them 
contacted the Skattefunn secretariat or Innovation Norway during the application process. The 
majority of enquiries related to whether or not their project met the criteria of the scheme. The firms 
would like more precise information about the requirements for a project to be approved, i.e. they ask 
for more predictability. Numerous firms have used consultants with extensive knowledge of the R&D 
tax credit scheme to formulate applications, in order to make it easier to facilitate the approval of their 
application. Firms that have had their application rejected tend to claim that policy makers and public 
servants do not understand the specifics of their industry. A particularly common claim was that there 
is a lack of understanding of how R&D is performed in various service industries. This is supported by 
Skattefunn’s own statistics, which show a higher rejection rate for projects in the service industries.  
However, this has gradually changed as Innovation Norway and the Skattefunn secretariat have gained 
more experience with service industry projects.   
 
Firms with approved projects were very satisfied with the R&D tax credit scheme. Within this group 
90 per cent reported in the 2007 survey that they were very or fairly positive to the tax credit scheme, 
57 per cent said they had not changed their opinion since the scheme was introduced, 30 per cent said 
they had become more positive to the scheme, and only ten per cent said they had become more 
negative. The latter is perhaps due to the introduction of a maximum hourly rate of NOK 500 in 2007. 
Numerous firms commented on this change. Even though firms that had had projects rejected were 
more negative than firms with approved projects, a majority of the former firms were also positive to 
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the scheme. 12 per cent said that they had become more positive to the scheme than when it was first 
introduced despite having had their projects rejected. The vast majority of these firms, 80 per cent, 
found the rejection to be unreasonable. Most firms, 60 per cent, also perceived the basis for the 
rejection to be poor.  A number of firms think that the process, involving three government bodies, 
needs to be simplified. With regard to approval of the R&D content, the Skattefunn secretariat has the 
final word and receives the most criticism. A high number of firms complain about the detailed project 
accounts that are required by the tax authorities. It seems that this requirement is not communicated 
clearly enough in the guidelines to the scheme. Many firms are also critical to the tax authorities’ 
corrections to their project accounts. The share of firms that think the ceiling for deductible costs 
should be raised increased between the two surveys. This is most likely because the ceiling had 
remained nominally constant from the introduction of the scheme in 2002. However, only 22 per cent 
of all firms receiving the tax credit in 2006 made full use of the cap of NOK 4 million for in-house 
R&D. About 60 per cent of the firms suggested that the scheme should be changed so that they would 
not have to wait a whole year to receive the tax relief payments. 
2.9. The administrative costs of the tax credit scheme 
The administrative costs of the tax credit scheme consist of the firms’ costs and the government’s 
costs. Firms incur costs when writing applications, preparing annual and final reports and providing 
control and certification of the project accounts. The government incurs costs in running the scheme in 
Innovation Norway, the Research Council of Norway and the tax authorities. 
 
Based on user surveys, Foyn and Lien (2007) estimate the firms’ own costs for applications and final 
reporting to be NOK 35 million for 2006. This is based on an average of 30 hours for completing 
applications and ten hours for preparing the final reporting for a total of 2,500 applications and 2,000 
annual reports (approved projects). The costs per firm vary considerably. An hourly rate of NOK 365 
was used when estimating costs. However, if the maximum hourly rate that applies to R&D tax credit 
projects for 2007 is used (NOK 500), the costs increase to NOK 48 million. About a third of the firms 
report that they use a consultant for this work. Assuming that an average of four hours are invoiced at 
an hourly rate of NOK 1,000, this amounts to NOK four million. The user survey shows that it is not 
uncommon for consultants to work on a “no approval, no fee” basis. Auditing costs are estimated at 
NOK 12 million. This estimate is also uncertain, since there are large variations in how much time the 
auditors spend on each form. A survey conducted among auditors suggests that they spend on average 
four hours on each form and that the hourly rate is about NOK 1,250. The firms’ total costs therefore 
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amount to NOK 47 million, excluding consultancy costs and assuming an hourly rate of NOK 365 for 
the firms’ use of time. This makes up about four per cent of the firms’ total tax deductions. 
 
In addition to the firms’ costs, the government also incurs costs. The Skattefunn secretariat at the 
Research Council of Norway has a budget of NOK 15 million for running the scheme, and Innovation 
Norway receives NOK eight million for its Skattefunn services. The costs of the tax authorities are 
more difficult to calculate, especially since the control efforts vary somewhat from year to year and 
between regions. The direct costs for tax audits in 2005 are estimated to be only NOK 250,000 based 
on a survey among tax offices. If estimated costs for auditing and handling complaints are also 
included, the total cost to the tax administration can be estimated to NOK 3.2 million. Some costs are 
also incurred by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade and Industry. These are estimated 
by the Government Agency for Financial Management (SSØ) to be NOK 1.4 million. The cost to all 
government agencies involved therefore amounted to about NOK 28 million in 2006. 
 
The above figures sum up to a total cost of approximately NOK 75 million for the firms and the public 
sector in 2006. This corresponds to almost seven per cent of the total tax relief that year.14 The 
administrative costs in the public sector alone correspond to only two per cent of the tax relief. This is 
very modest. The total estimated costs for the government are NOK 1,126 million in tax expenses and 
NOK 28 million in administrative costs, giving a total of NOK 1.15 billion. If we include a tax 
financing cost in the form of a 20 per cent efficiency loss (in order to account for the amount that 
needs  to be financed from an increase in other taxes which distorts the resource use in the economy), 
the public costs of the R&D tax credit scheme amount to NOK 1.4 billion for 2006. This is less than 
0.1 % of GDP. 
3. Discussion of our main findings 
We have found that the R&D tax credit scheme has a large and positive effect on industry’s R&D 
activity. An input additionality factor of around two is high compared to what is previously found in 
the international literature. The R&D tax credit scheme, which was introduced in 2002, has been in use 
during a period in which the increase in industry’s overall R&D activity has been modest. In 2005, the 
total R&D expenses in Norway were NOK 29.6 billion, which constitute 1.5 per cent of GDP. Of this, 
industry accounted for NOK 13.6 billion, the institute sector for NOK 6.9 billion and the university 
and university college sector for the remaining NOK 9.1 billion. Our additionality estimate shows that 
                                                     
14 Mohnen and Lokshin (2009, footnote 4) report that the total administrative costs are about nine per cent of total support in 
both the Dutch and Canadian R&D tax credit schemes. 
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without the tax credit scheme, the industry’s R&D activity would have been NOK 2.4 billion lower 
this year. A good half of this can be linked to small firms with less than ten employees, which were 
excluded from the R&D statistics in 2005. We therefore estimate that the industry’s R&D activity 
according to the R&D statistics would have been around NOK 12.4 billion in 2005 if the tax credit 
scheme had not existed. Its total share of GDP in 2005 would have been 0.6 per cent, down from 0.8 
per cent in 2001 - the last observation before the R&D tax credit scheme was introduced. Even with 
our lowest additionality estimate of 1.3, the R&D share would have fallen without the tax credit 
scheme. 
 
It may be questioned whether it is reasonable that the R&D activity in industry should have decreased 
to such an extent during the period we consider. It is a common assumption that R&D expenses are 
procyclical, i.e. that their growth in real terms is positively correlated with the GDP growth. If this is 
the case, business cycle conditions could be an acceptable explanation for the first two or three years 
after 2001, but not thereafter when the Norwegian economy boomed. On the other hand, a number of 
Nordic countries have reported a certain stagnation and relative downturn in the intensity of R&D 
activity in the 2000s, so the development in Norway is not exceptional. Nevertheless, our 
counterfactual result of what the R&D investments would have been without the R&D tax credit 
scheme is somewhat surprising when viewed in relation to the macroeconomic development. 
 
That R&D is procyclical, may be most relevant to large firms that are dominant in the R&D surveys in 
the OECD countries. It is possible that R&D is counter-cyclical for the small firms which are 
dominant in the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme. Small firms may not be in a position to increase 
their R&D activity to any great degree during a boom in the economy. On the basis of limited 
resources as a whole, small firms may cut down on R&D activities in order to increase their 
production capacity during times of prosperity. If this is so, it may explain why there was a decrease in 
the number of tax credit applications after 2004. On the other hand, according to the 2006 R&D 
survey by Statistics Norway, large firms did not increase their R&D activity very much either during 
the economic recovery from 2003 to 2006. 15 
 
We have concluded that the R&D tax credit scheme has made a positive contribution to industry’s 
R&D activity, but, strictly speaking, this is just an essential prerequisite for defending the scheme. In 
light of our findings, it could be asked why the authorities should stimulate R&D activity in projects 
                                                     
15 If large and small R&D firms are affected in different ways by the economic cycles, the assumption that we have had to 
use as a basis for the additionality analysis is not valid. What drives the R&D growth in large and small R&D firms is an 
issue that we would like to explore further in future research. 
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that are as market-oriented as those that the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme seems to be 
stimulating. What market failure is it that the scheme is correcting? Our evaluation shows that the 
scheme primarily stimulates small firms’ R&D activity, and particularly R&D in firms that have not 
previously carried out much R&D. The R&D that the tax credit scheme stimulates does not seem to 
create innovations of a kind that can be expected to have large external effects. When we find that 
small firms seem to respond most strongly to the R&D tax credit, this can be explained in two ways. 
These firms have first of all been given a major price reduction on R&D and have responded by 
increasing their R&D activity. Second, their response may be due to the fact that they face financing 
problems linked to their R&D activity, and that the scheme has helped solve these problems. The latter 
explanation is consistent with a large part of the total tax deductions being paid as a grant to firms that 
are not in a tax position. The first component has nothing to do with market failure, while the second 
does and has been used to justify government R&D policies, cf. Hall (2002). It could be argued that 
financing problems are not helped to any great extent in the current scheme since the support that is 
paid to firms that are not liable to taxation takes place well after the project costs have been incurred. 
On the other hand, an approved project will act as a kind of security, since it is almost certain to entail 
a future payout. The evaluation has revealed that many firms regard liquidity as a problem. 
 
In the current tax credit scheme, the Research Council of Norway approves the project, while the tax 
authorities approve the tax deductions. This implies that even when a firm’s project has been 
approved, there remains some uncertainty as to what support the firm will actually receive. Legal 
disputes sometimes arise between the firms and the tax administration although the scope for this is 
limited in Norway as compared to countries in which prior approval of projects is not part of the 
scheme.  
4. Conclusions 
We find that the Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme introduced in 2002 mainly works as intended. The 
scheme is cost-effective and it is used by a large number of firms. It stimulates these firms to invest 
more in R&D, and in particular, the effect is positive for small firms with little R&D experience. The 
returns on the R&D investments supported by the scheme are positive and generally not different from 
the returns to other R&D investments. We have found examples of what can be interpreted as tax 
motivated misuse of the scheme, but to some extent one must accept this as a cost to subsidy and 
support schemes intended for use by a large number of economic agents. This is particularly so when 
administrative expenditures and control routines are kept at a low level. 
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A follow-up question to the above main conclusion is whether there might be alternatives to 
Skattefunn, that might perform even better. This issue has not been a main focus in our evaluation. 
However, in our analysis of the interaction between different R&D policy instruments, Skattefunn 
stands out as a good scheme. In line with the Hervik Committee’s argument for having a broad set of 
instruments in the R&D policy, we believe that a scheme in the style of Skattefunn is well justified.  
 
There are a number of alternatives to the current Norwegian scheme. However, we do not believe that 
any of the international alternatives have any obvious benefits, and in particular we do not recommend 
converting to a system supporting the increase in R&D as opposed to the level of R&D, i.e. we 
recommend retaining a volume-based scheme rather than choosing an incremental scheme. Experience 
and common sense tell us that volume-based schemes are the easiest to administer. An incremental 
scheme might produce higher input additionality than a volume-based scheme because it provides 
special stimulus for firms that increase their R&D activity significantly, but international studies are 
not clear on this point.  Moreover, it is not clear which market failure argument applies in particular to 
firms that grow rapidly. 
 
The Norwegian R&D tax credit scheme has two provisions that favour specific types of firms. First, 
small and medium sized firms receive a slightly higher tax deduction than large firms where size is 
measured in terms of number of employees, turnover etc. We have no evaluation results that clearly 
address whether the difference in the deduction percentages (20 versus 18 per cent) is rational. 
Simplicity suggests that a single deduction rate of 20 per cent could just as well have been applied, but 
consideration to EEA support regulations places limitations on the formulation of the rules. The other 
provision is that the upper limit for the deduction is higher if the firm buys R&D services from an 
approved research institute. We have no evaluation results that allow us to draw strong conclusions 
regarding the scheme’s effectiveness on this point, but we find that this element of the scheme is well 
argued for. 
 
We do not believe there are good arguments for removing the caps in the scheme. The intention of the 
scheme is to act as a supplement to other R&D policy instruments, and in particular to ensure that 
some R&D support is available to firms with little R&D experience and prior contact with the 
Research Council of Norway or other parts of the innovation policy system. The financing of these 
firms’ R&D activity can be difficult, and to the extent that capital market imperfections are considered 
the main justification for the scheme, this suggests that the caps should be kept. In a system with no 
caps, firms with large R&D investments would be able to increase their R&D activity considerably. 
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There is no reason to believe that these firms face severe financing constraints. In order to stimulate 
more R&D in large firms, the authorities should rather increase the availability of traditional R&D 
grants as suggested by the Hervik Commission. These grants should be directed towards projects with 
large externalities and low private returns. 
 
There is much focus on evaluating R&D subsidy schemes both in Norway and abroad. It is, however, 
considered an ideal that the schemes should be general, in the sense that they apply equally to all 
firms. This is somewhat contradictory. The reason for this is that the greater the degree of equal 
treatment in the scheme, the further away we are from the ideal evaluation situation with a comparison 
of recipients that are equal, except from the fact that some have access to the scheme and others do 
not. Given that economists and authorities are uncertain about the effectiveness of R&D policies, an 
evaluation design should be built into the schemes as argued by Jaffe (2002). Since a valid control 
group must be part of a good evaluation design, this implies that some agents that would want to use 
the scheme must be excluded from it. 16 In other scientific fields, such as medicine, this is widely 
accepted. Hence, there is a trade-off between formulating the scheme optimally in relation to the 
knowledge available today, and formulating it so that it can be improved and work better in the future. 
                                                     
16 Using the tax system to discriminate between identical firms would be unconstitutional in most countries. Building in an 
evaluation aspect may therefore be easier in direct grant systems. However, some randomization can easily be built into R&D 
tax credit schemes e.g. by limiting the tax credit to SMEs. According to the EU/EEA state aid rules, SMEs are defined as 
firms fulfilling two out of three size criteria, and firms just above and below the limits will be quite comparable.  
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